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Comment Letter on April 2001 Exposure Draft - Independence
The staff of the Independence Standards Board appreciates the
opportunity to comment on your April 2001 Exposure Draft. The
Board of the ISB has not considered these matters and reaches
conclusions only after extensive due process and deliberation.
Consequently, the comments below reflect the staff’s views and
should not be attributed to the Board or to any Board member.
We congratulate the Ethics Committee for an excellent document
and are very pleased to see the continuing convergence of our views
with yours. We intend, for example, to recommend to our Board a
revised definition of independence in our conceptual framework
document that is quite similar to the one included in your ED.
Our comments on specific matters follow:
Impair vs. Compromise
A dictionary definition of impair is “to make worse.” In connection
with our conceptual framework project we concluded that using the
word impair as you do in paragraph 8.8 (“influences that impair
professional judgment”) could be misinterpreted. Therefore we use
the word “compromise” and explain the difference as follows: “An
auditor’s objectivity is ‘impaired’ if it is negatively affected to any
degree; objectivity is ‘compromised’ if the impairment rises to the
level of precluding unbiased audit decisions.”
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Definitions
Audit client
-

We believe the definition regarding related parties should apply to private
companies as well because the threats from such relationships are the same.

Independence
-

In describing independence of mind the ED uses the term “impair professional
judgment,” whereas for independence in appearance the ED says “unacceptably
impaired.” Do the terms mean the same thing?

-

We suggest that independence in appearance be defined as the third party
concluding that the firm or auditor lacks independence of mind to show the linkage
between the two concepts.

-

It would be helpful if the document provided guidance to auditors and others on
how they should assess whether “a reasonable and informed third party…would
reasonably conclude [that] integrity, objectivity or professional skepticism had been
unacceptably impaired.”

-

As used, the definition should end with “…or practice lines.”

Office

Paragraph 8.7
-

We believe that other “independence decision makers,” such as audit committees
and management, should and will also use the document to assess auditor
independence, and therefore they should be referred to specifically in this or another
paragraph.

Paragraph 8.8
-

see discussion under “Definitions” above

Paragraph 8.22
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-

We recognize the necessity for the “unless they are prohibited from complying”
language. We believe, however, that the audit firm still should be required to make
an assessment as to whether in such situations its independence would be
compromised or would appear to others to be compromised. If the firm concludes
its independence would be compromised, then the firm should decline the
engagement even if the reason for the compromised independence is compliance
with the law. This self-assessment should also be required in paragraph 8.136.

Paragraph 8.29
-

We would make a distinction between immediate family members and close family
members. We would prohibit any employment of immediate family members of
those on the engagement because the self-interest and familiarity threats arising
from such employment, because of either financial or emotional ties, are too great
to be overcome by any safeguard other than removal. We also believe that in the
vast majority of cases such a requirement would not involve any significant cost
because others could replace any affected professionals.

Paragraph 8.35 (d)
-

We suggest that the examples of safeguards within the assurance client include the
appropriate “tone at the top” – clear and regular messages from the audit committee
and senior management emphasizing the company’s commitment to fair financial
reporting.

Paragraph 8.38
-

We suggest specific acknowledgement that compensation and promotion policies
which reward quality audits and professionalism play an important role in
supporting auditor independence.

Paragraph 8.40
-

If there are situations where the new requirements are more stringent than existing
ones, you might consider “grandfathering” those relationships that are acceptable
currently. This in our judgment would be reasonable and would permit an earlier
effective date because existing relationships would not have to be unwound. Under
such circumstances, we would suggest an effective date – for new relationships –
six months after the issuance of the final statement.

Paragraph 8.106
-

In cases where the disposal period is long (say more than thirty days), even if the
disposal is at “the earliest practical date,” we believe the self-interest threat is too
great to be mitigated by any safeguards. We also believe such financial interests
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would fail an appearance test. The affected professional should be prohibited from
serving on the engagement.
Paragraph 8.107
-

We repeat the comment above regarding “earliest practical date.” On the other
hand, we believe that materiality should be measured against the net worth of both
the relative and the audit professional. As we said in our letter of August 14, 2000,
we do not believe an investment by, for example, an adult child of the auditor that is
material to the child but trivial in relation to the net worth of the auditor would
compromise, or appear to compromise, the auditor’s independence.

Paragraph 8.108
-

We understand that service as a trustee (at least in United States) creates fiduciary
responsibilities to the trust. Such responsibilities would, in our judgment,
compromise the auditor’s independence even it the auditor is not a beneficiary or
the interest is not material to the trust. Furthermore, even if there is no significant
influence over investment decisions, knowledge of the investment by the auditor
combined with the fiduciary responsibility as trustee could have a compromising
effect on independence.

Paragraph 8.112
-

We agree, except that we would also prohibit joint negotiations for a financial
interest in a closely-held company, regardless of materiality.

Paragraphs 8.114/115/116
-

We do not believe that allowing audit client loans to the audit firm or to a member
of the assurance team satisfies a cost-benefit analysis. Although one could argue
that an immaterial loan from an audit client would not jeopardize the auditor’s
independence, we believe that even immaterial loans are bound to raise questions
about favorable terms and the appropriateness of the relationship between auditor
and client.

-

The document states, in paragraphs 8.114 and 8.115, that the loan or deposit
“would not create a threat to independence.” Similar language is used in other
paragraphs. In addition to disagreeing with the conclusions, as discussed above, we
believe it may be more accurate to acknowledge that there is a threat but that in
IFAC’s judgment it is not significant enough to impair [compromise] the auditor’s
independence.

Paragraphs 8.117/118
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-

We do not believe the audit firm or member of the assurance team should be
making, holding or guaranteeing any loans by or to an audit client, regardless of
materiality. We believe the very act of engaging in the transaction, or monitoring
an ongoing relationship, compromises objectivity and the appearance of objectivity.

Paragraph 8.120
-

An interest in a closely held entity normally involves negotiations directly with the
entity or another shareholder of the entity, as contrasted with the impersonal process
of buying stock in a traded company. Furthermore, by definition, the number of
shareholders in a closely held entity is small, and the opportunity – and in some
cases the need – for contacts between and among shareholders is high.
Consequently, we believe the familiarity and self-interest threats, as well as the
appearance concern, are too strong to permit the firm or a professional on the
engagement to have any interests in a closely-held entity along with the client or a
director or officer of the client.

Paragraph 8.129
-

In addition to the safeguards described, there should be assessment of the
relationship between remaining members of the audit team and the former
professional now in a responsible position at the client. The purpose would be to
replace those team members whose objectivity might be compromised by their
familiarity or respect for their former colleague.

Paragraphs 8.148-156
-

We agree with the conclusions in these paragraphs except we do not believe it is
necessary to have a limitation on the size of the fees for the services permitted by
8.155.

Paragraph 8.178
-

We believe the reference to paragraph 8.144 should be 8.1

Paragraph 8.184
-

We do not believe that requiring management to make the decisions on employment
of senior managers of the company can mitigate the threats identified in this
paragraph. The process of interviewing candidates and identifying those who
should be referred to the client represent important decisions which should not be
delegated to the audit firm. On the other hand, we believe it is acceptable and
reasonable for members of the assurance team – or others from the audit firm - to
interview candidates previously selected by the company.

1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775
(212) 596-6133  fax (212) 596-6137
Web site: www.cpaindependence.org

Paragraphs 8.187-188
-

We believe there are situations when the size of the fees relative to the firm, or a
subset of the firm, depending on how it is organized, are so material that the only
safeguard is to decline the engagement. In other cases discussion of the situation
with the audit committee might be appropriate. We have proposed a project on that
subject to our Board because it is so pervasive and difficult.

Paragraph 8.189
-

We do not agree that disclosure of unpaid fees in the financial statements or
assurance report is an effective safeguard. Readers will not know how to evaluate
the information. There may, however, be cases where the past due unpaid fee is so
large that it creates a self-interest threat that can only be resolved by declining to
serve as the continuing auditor. Guidance on when that point is reached would be
helpful.

Paragraph 8.195
-

We believe there should be a presumption that actual or threatened litigation by the
client involving the audit should require the auditor to withdraw. The other
safeguards described are unlikely to mitigate the threats created by such a lawsuit.
We also believe that declining to continue to serve as the auditor should be required
when there is any other litigation between the firm and the client that is either
material to either party or raises questions about the client’s integrity or willingness
to be candid with the auditor.

-

There is no guidance regarding investment companies, including independence
requirements relating to the investment advisor and other investment companies in
the same group. The rules issued recently by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission include such guidance, based generally on ISB Standard No. 2, and we
encourage you to include such guidance in your pronouncement.

-

There is also no guidance regarding what in the United States are known as
alternative practice structures. This would include formal and informal affiliations
with auditing firms in other countries or cities, or with providers of other services.
A fuller discussion of the arrangements and independence issues can be found in
ISB Discussion Memorandum 99-2.

Other

*****
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We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,

Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
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